Bein Adam LeChaveiro: Shalom Bayit Part II – Which home?
God created people as “male and female” and determined “it is not good for man to be alone.” Previously, we explored the significance of shalom (peace, harmonious living), which optimally begins with a harmonious home life and spreads from there throughout the community and to the world beyond.
We now turn our attention to a halakhic matter that seems designed to maintain shalom between a married couple – the issue of a married woman’s obligation to honor her parents. How does halakha deal with the tension between a woman’s obligation to her “original” family, those who bore and raised her, versus her “new” family now that she is married?
To honor and revere
The mishna states: “All the mitzvot for the father on the son (mitzvot ha-av al ha-ben) – both men and women are obligated.”[1] The gemara explains that “the mitzvot for the father on the son” are the mitzvot of honoring (kibbud) and revering (mora) parents.[2]
The mitzvah to honor one’s parents consists of the actions involved in caring for the parents’ welfare – “give them food and drink, clothe and cover them, and accompany them in and out.” The mitzvah to revere parents is observed by refraining from certain behaviors “not to stand in their place, sit in their place, contradict their statements…” to show honor and reverence.[3]
As a proof that both men and women are commanded to honor and revere their parents, the beraita brings the verse: “Ish aviv v’imo tira’u,” “A person shall revere their father and mother.” The verse curiously alternates between the singular “ish” for a person or man, and the plural “tira’u” “they shall revere.” The beraita uses the plural “tira’u” as a proof that both men and women are obligated, but continues that to explain the singular “ish”: “A man has the means to do so, a woman does not have the means to do so, since other people are in charge of her.”[4]
While one might think that the statement “she does not have the means to do so” would completely exempt women from the mitzvot of honoring and revering parents, the gemara explains this is not the case.[5] Rav Idi bar Avin states in Rav’s name that a woman who is divorced or widowed (we can add single) is obligated.[6] This seems to be the only mitzvah a woman is exempt from performing if she is married. Furthermore, the exemption may be further limited to circumstances when a married woman does not have the means, rather than an overarching exemption.
There is halakhic consensus that married women have some sort of exemption from the mitzvah to honor their parents, but the extent of the exemption is unclear. Does the gemara’s language “she does not have the means” provide a blanket exemption? Or only when she is unable because she does not have the means?
The extent of the exemption is related to the question of the reasoning behind it. The various approaches in the commentaries on the gemara and subsequent halakhic works raise further questions over the relevance and applicability of this exemption in modern times.
Explaining the exemption
There are two main approaches to explain why married women do not have the same obligation to honor their parents.
The first is based on practical constraints. The marriage pact contains certain explicit and implicit obligations, some have changed over time while others remain the same. For generations, a married woman’s obligations to her husband may have prevented her from honoring her parents (be it household chores or general commitment to building a household with her husband).[7] Moreover, she may not live close enough to her parents to fulfill the mitzvah, as Tosafot explain: “she is not located near her father, but rather near her husband.[8]
Rambam and Shulchan Arukh debate whether this technical reason creates a full exemption, or if it’s limited. Rav Yosef Karo does not limit the exemption. In Beit Yosef he writes that a married woman is exempt because she is subservient to her husband; in Shulchan Arukh he states that a woman is exempt when she “is still married.”[9]
Rambam, on the other hand, limits the exemption. He states that a married woman’s exemption does not include “what she can perform along with the chores she is legally obligated to do for her husband.” Meaning, the exemption only seems to apply when there’s a conflict between her obligations.[10]
A husband also has certain obligations to his wife, such as providing “food, clothing, and physical intimacy.” Why is there no mention of an exemption for married men? A man’s obligations to his wife aren’t necessarily time consuming or even daily actions – like cooking, cleaning, or breastfeeding. While wives were expected to maintain a household, the husbands’ obligations tend to be focused on the end result (having enough money to provide for the needs of his wife and maintaining a somewhat regular intimate relationship).[11]
Based on the approach that a married woman’s exemption is due to practical constraints, Shach concludes that Shulchan Arukh’s exemption only applies if the husband objects; if he does not then a married woman is obligated to honor her parents “in every way possible, like a man.”[12]
A second approach sees a more intrinsic reason for the exemption: once married, a woman’s primary duty moves from her parents’ home to that of her new family. Rashi explains that the beraita’s language of “other people are in charge of her,” means that she is subject to her husband’s authority since “she feels dread of him.”[13] In other words, the Torah exempted married women from their obligations to their parents to prevent a conflict of interest and tension with her husband.[14]
Yet it’s also possible to frame the intrinsic reason for the exemption in a way that is not primarily focused on the man’s authority. Instead, we can understand that the exemption allows for the woman to shift her focus and attention from her original family to the new family she creates with her husband. This reasoning is also reflected in sources referencing the woman’s move from her parents home to that of her husband.
Are women still exempt today?
How do these approaches affect a modern married woman’s obligation to her parents?
If the exemption is technical, specifically due to a woman’s obligations to her husband, then, nowadays, there should be no distinction between a married and unmarried woman’s obligations to her parents. Rambam did not completely exempt a married woman from the mitzvah of honoring her parents; he limited her exemption to prioritize her obligations to her husband and current household. Modern shifts in the division of financial and household responsibilities seem to reflect a change in the spouses commitment to one another (which assumes that the marital contract has changed as well).
If the exemption is merely technical and the premise “she does not have the means” is no longer relevant, then the exemption should be void as well. Instead, we should follow the Shach’s position – if the husband does not object, then his wife’s obligation remains in full. Indeed, Rabbi Yaakov Ariel states:
“Today, a woman enters the chuppah with the mindset that her husband will treat her as Jewish men do these days, that they accept their wives will fulfill the mitzvah of honoring their parents.”[15]
On the other hand, if the point of the exemption is to ensure married women prioritize their new family over their parents, it seems that the exemption should remain. The Torah’s language indicates that a married woman transitions from her parents’ home to that of her husband. While the relevance of this imagery can be debated, the inherent reality of conflicting priorities and limits in time and energy remains a pertinent and significant issue.
While there are those who maintain the husband’s position dictates the wife’s exemption, like Rashi (the husband may protest that his wife serves her parents) and Tosafot (a woman is exempt because she is in her husband’s domain), this doesn’t necessarily mean their intention is to prioritize a husband’s wishes over those of the wife. Instead of restricting her actions, these opinions may intend to free her from the stress of multiple conflicting obligations, by telling her she is obligated to prioritize her new home when it’s necessary.
Therefore, when a couple, or more specifically a wife, has the time to honor her parents, it’s appropriate for her to do so as much as possible. Still she maintains the option of weighing the impact the time and effort she dedicates to her parents has on her marital relationship and new family. While the dynamic between spouses has drastically changed, this is still relevant today. The shalom bayit of her new household should be prioritized over her prior obligation to her parents. Using this approach, it seems that the Shach’s position should not be the default approach, but rather a tool to evaluate each individual case.[16]
[1] Kiddushin 1:7
[2] B. Kiddushin 29a
[3] ibid
[4] Vayikra 19:3; B. Kiddushin 29a-30b; Sifra Kedoshim 1; Tosefta Lieberman Kiddushin 1:11; Y. Kiddushin 1:7; Y. Pe’ah 1:1.
The drasha on the verse does not include the reason, which may affect how the source is understood.
[5] B. Kiddushin 35b
[6] B. Kiddushin 30b
[7] A wife’s duties to her husband are listed in Ketubot 5:5, and mostly include housework. Mishna 17, in the continuation of the chapter, discusses physical intimacy. The husband does not have an automatic right to demand physical intimacy, but it is considered a foundational aspect of marriage. For more see Netziv, Merumei Sadeh on Kiddushin 30b.
[8] Tosafot Kiddushin 30b, s.v. “sheyesh.” It’s possible that the husband dictates where they live because it’s one of his duties – either as part of clothing or physical intimacy. (Ketubot 47b-48a) And while a wife can compel her husband to move to Israel, that is a more general rule. (Ketubot 110b)
[9] Beit Yosef YD 240; Shulchan Arukh YD 240:17.
[10] Rambam Commentary on the Mishna, Kiddushin 1:7. (More subtly in Hilkhot Mamrim 6:6) Compare to Tosafot Rosh Ketubot 39a.
[11] See Perisha on Yoreh De’ah 240:25. A husband’s obligations to his wife are derived from Shemot 21:10. See B. Ketubot 47b; Rambam Hilkhot Ishut 12:2.
[12] Shakh YD 240:19
[13] Rashi Kiddushin 35b s.v. “sipeik b’yado”
[14] Tosafot (in footnote 6) points out that Torah laws need Torah level exemptions.
[15]Rav Yaakov Ariel ibid. (note 8), pg. 142
[16] Rav Eliezer Melamed doesn’t discuss the husband’s part of this relationship, he mentions that the wife has veto power over the way her husband honors his parents (she can prevent her in-laws from moving into the home she shares with her husband). (Peninei Halakha Likutei 3, pg. 15-17; Rav Menachem Slay “Diyur u’tnaei megurim shel zaken” Techumin 7 5747, pg. 255-265)