Bein Adam leChaveiro: Where do we begin?
The past two weeks we’ve discussed the difficulty of categorizing mitzvot. Chazal never explicitly categorize mitzvot into “mitzvot shebein adam lechaveiro” (commandments between one person and another) and “mitzvot shebein adam laMakom” (commandments between a person and God). Nevertheless, generations of Torah scholars have accepted the existence of such categories and explored the inherent and practical differences between them.[1]
We also noted important similarities. Interpersonal mitzvot are part of our service of God, and many mitzvot bein adam laMakom benefit other people. One question remains before we move on from generalities and focus on halakhot of specific interpersonal mitzvot:
Why focus our series on mitzvot bein adam lechaveiro?
We chose the topic of interpersonal mitzvot because of one of the more striking differences between the two types of mitzvot: the perceived importance of each type of mitzvah. Throughout the ages Torah scholars have lamented the relative disregard too many Jews have for mitzvot shebein adam lechaveiro.
For example, the mishna in Nedarim states that one can make a false vow that food is teruma (and therefore prohibited to eat) to dissuade thieves, armed or unarmed, from robbing them.[2] Rosh explains that these thieves are willing to steal and kill, but they’re not willing to eat prohibited foods.
The gemara in Kiddushin speaks of a similar phenomenon:
“Rava said, Rav Idi explained to me: ‘Say of the tzaddik (righteous person) who is good that they shall eat the fruit of their deeds.’ (Yishayahu 3:10) Is there a tzaddik who is good and a tzaddik who is not good? Rather, one who is good to the Heavens and to people is a good tzaddik, and one who is good to the Heavens and bad to people is a tzaddik who is not good.
“And you say similarly: ‘Woe to an evil rasha (wicked person), for the results of their actions will be done to them.’ Is there a rasha that is wicked and a rasha that is not wicked? Rather, one that is wicked to Heavens and wicked to people is a wicked rasha, wicked to the Heavens and not wicked to people, this is a rasha who is not wicked.”[3]
These sources are confident that there are people who disregard interpersonal mitzvot but meticulously observe mitzvot shebein adam laMakom. How can such people exist? The importance of interpersonal mitzvot is apparent throughout biblical and rabbinic texts; it’s discussed in classrooms, synagogues, and around Shabbat tables throughout the Jewish world. Is it possible we still don’t understand that dishonoring other people dishonors God as well? Or is there another reason we don’t properly observe these mitzvot?
Indeed, Chatam Sofer offers another explanation. He tried to understand how people could hold themselves to high standards in spiritual mitzvot, painstakingly observing every possible stringency, yet treat interpersonal mitzvot with remarkable laxity, conducting shady business deals because “the Torah does not expressly forbid it.”[4] Chatam Sofer doesn’t blame this on a lack of values, but raises the possibility that it may be more difficult to properly observe mitzvot bein adam lechaveiro; controlling our behavior is more complicated when other people are involved.
Rabbi Yisrael Salanter, the father of the “Mussar Movement,” was similarly concerned by Jews who were exceedingly careful with the laws of kashrut but lax with ethical mitzvot like theft and ona’a (taking advantage of others or causing them distress). It seemed to him that people wouldn’t bother to repent for interpersonal transgressions if they weren’t caught red-handed.[5] Why?
Rav Yisrael Salanter believed that part of the problem was people’s relative ignorance of the halakhot of mitzvot shebein adam lechaveiro. The solution was more Torah study, specifically in-depth study of interpersonal halakhot such as business ethics. In addition to mirroring the type of study usually reserved for spiritual laws such as kosher foods, he also suggested using the same language to reflect the gravity of these laws – “issur v’heter,” “prohibited and permitted.”[6]
Following the advice of Rabbi Yisrael Salanter, we will delve into halakhot of mitzvot shebein adam lechaveiro, we will learn what is prohibited and what is permitted, with the aim of improving our observance of interpersonal mitzvot.
Ultimately, this can help us achieve larger goals. As Rambam explained, the study and observance of mitzvot serves other people and serves our Creator, while also serving our own interests by enriching our mind and soul. This raises the possibility of another category of mitzvot: mitzvot shebein adam l’atzmo, commandments that are between a person and themselves.
Mitzvot shebein adam l’atzmo: Mitzvot for oneself
Several Torah scholars note that some mitzvot benefit, or “are good for” the individual who performs the mitzvah.[7] Occasionally, they refer to this category as mitzvot shebein adam l’atzmo.[8] Much like we saw with Rambam’s explanation of three goals of mitzvot, these opinions all focus on the benefit to the metaphysical self – an individual’s spiritual and intellectual wellbeing and development.
Are there physical mitzvot shebein adam l’atzmo?
We don’t have complete autonomy over ourselves and our bodies. God mandates certain actions and prohibits others – often for our own benefit. God commanded both Adam and Noach and sons to “be fruitful and multiply;” one could claim this mitzvah is somewhat self-serving. After the flood, God prohibits Noach and his sons from taking human life – even one’s own life.[9] Beyond the God-given human and animal instinct for self-preservation, God commands us to procreate and prohibits taking one’s own life.
The Torah prohibits other forms of self-harm as well. “You are children of the Eternal, your God, do not cut yourselves and do not put a bald spot between your eyes for the dead.”[10] Rashi explains that these are marks or cuts the Amorites would make when mourning the death of family members. Since we are God’s children: “you are worthy of being good looking and not cut and hairless.” Self-harm is prohibited, as God’s children we are commanded to preserve our dignity.
Are these commandments merely a subset of mitzvot shebein adam lechaveiro? We have certain obligations to people, and we are people too. Or is this another category of mitzvot?
Interestingly, the Torah bases the overarching commandment to care for others in an assumption of self-care, inexorably linking our obligations to ourselves and our obligations to others. “V’ahavta l’reiakha kamokha,” “Love others as yourself.” This implies an obligation to love ourselves. The inverse is true as well – do not harm others as you would not harm yourself, as we saw in Hillel’s brief summary of the Torah: “What you hate, don’t do to others. The rest is commentary, go learn.”
How far does halakha take this category of “self-care?”
Next week we will examine the rabbinic idea of “chayekha kodmim l’chayei chaveirekha,” your life takes precedence over that of your fellow.
[1] Some try to find inherent differences. For example, one claim is that mitzvot bein adam laMakom stress the importance of kavana (intention), whereas mitzvot bein adam lechaveiro are result oriented. If one intends to pray and is prevented from doing so, they are still rewarded for their intention; whereas the merit of prayer without intention is questionable. But a mitzvah such as tzedakah (charity) is the opposite: if someone gives charity but it doesn’t get to the recipient, they have not fulfilled the mitzvah. Whereas if they end up giving money to a poor person, they fulfilled the mitzvah, whether they intended to or not. For more see Rav Yosef Engel, Avtan d’Oraita 13.
Others discuss more practical differences – like the lack of blessings over mitzvot shebein adam lechaveiro.
[2] TB Nedarim 27b
[3] TB Kiddushin 40b
[4] Drashot Chatam Sofer, Drosh l’Shabbat HaGadol 5573
[6] Indeed, semicha tests for those seeking the title of rabbi generally cover laws of Shabbat, kashrut (issur v’heter, basar v’chalav), family purity, weddings, and mourning. Monetary laws are reserved for those studying to be dayanim, judges. There are no tests on the halakhot of tzedakah, chessed, returning lost items, respecting parents, gossip, or any of the other myriad of mitzvot shebein adam lechaveiro.
[7] See Maharsha Chiddushei Aggadot Bava Kama 30a. The gemara gives three areas of focus for someone who wants to be a chassid: matters of nezikin (damages), matters of brakhot (blessings), and matters of avot (fathers/ancestors). Maharsha explains matters of damages is for the benefit of others, brakhot, prayer, is for God, and avot refers to Mishna Avot, Ethics of the Fathers, which he says explains character traits that benefit the individual.
[8] Maharal’s commentary on Avot 1:1 explains the statement that the Torah rests on three things: Torah, avoda (service/prayer), gemilut chassadim (acts of kindness) to mean that these three things can make a person complete. Gemilut chassadim is mitzvot bein adam lechaveiro, avoda is bein adam laMakom, and Torah is mitzvot bein adam l’atzmo, because it helps make a person whole.
[9] Bereishit 9:5. When God permits Noach and his children to kill and eat meat, they are also given the basic prohibitions and laws of murder. God states: “But your blood for your lives I will seek, from each animal I will seek it.” Rashi explains the first part of the verse forbids death by suicide.
[10] Devarim 14:1
