From Parsha to Halakha: Matot – The release of vows floats on air
The quote “I promised, but I never promised I’d keep it,” is attributed to Levi Eshkol. Indeed, promises don’t create halakhically binding obligations.[1] But a shvu’a (oath) or neder (vow) does, and a person can use these mechanisms to create a Torah level obligation for themselves.[2]
Guard the utterance of your lips
In the Torah, vows (nedarim) are generally related to sanctification. One can vow to bring a sacrifice or to sanctify an animal – as a sacrifice or donation.[3] A vow can also sanctify a location, like when Yaakov commits to make a stone into a “House of God.”[4] A vow can sanctify a person, or their hair, like a Nazir.[5]
In Tanakh, oaths (shevuot) are generally made for emphasis or assurance that the speaker will fulfill their word or threat.[6] When someone does not fulfill an oath made in God’s name, they not only desecrate their oath, they desecrate God’s name as well.[7]
The Torah demands we keep our word: “Guard the utterance of your lips and do as you vowed to the Eternal, your God, [fulfill] the voluntary offering (nedava) that your mouth spoke.” Kohelet adds: “It’s better not to vow than to vow and not pay it.”[8] Consequently, the sages debate if the Torah generally views vows critically – “better than both is not to vow in the first place,” or if vows can be valuable, as long as they are fulfilled.[9]
On one hand, nedarim can be seen as an attempt to force God to act in a certain way. If a person states they will do something for God “in return” as long as God saves them, protects them, or helps them win a battle, it seems like they’re making a bargain with God, inappropriately putting themselves on equal footing.[10]
An oath adding an external obligation to a voluntary act may also run contrary to Torah values. The Torah already mandates we act in a certain manner, surely this is sufficient; adding extra obligations can be seen as an attempt to remove one’s freedom of choice from what should be a voluntary act.[11] For example, Yiftach could have waited until he got home to voluntarily bring an offering to God, instead he makes a vow, commits to sanctify the first thing to come out of his home, and believes his vow leaves him with no other choice.[12]
On the other hand, a neder can be seen as a positive thing. Perhaps the individual recognizes that it’s inappropriate to ask of God if they are unwilling to give of themselves and to do everything in their power to do good in the world.[13] Chana made a neder like this and it led to the birth of Shmuel, who became one of the foremost leaders of the People of Israel.[14]
Annulling vows
The Torah demands people fulfill their vows, “he should not desecrate (yakhel) his word, everything he uttered he shall do;” yet the Torah also teaches that some vows can be annulled – a father can annul the vows (hafarat nedarim) of his na’ara daughter (a brief stage of maturity between halakhic minority and majority), and a husband can annul his wife’s vows.[15]
The power to annul these vows can be understood as a type of veto the property-owning male head-of-the-household – the father or husband – has over the vows and oaths of the women of the house. This seems to be the understanding of those who limit his veto power to oaths and vows that affect him, his property, or his relationship with her in some way, such as a vow sanctifying his property or an oath mandating actions that affect him as well.[16] One could also attribute it to plain, old patriarchy; the father or husband is responsible for the wellbeing of “his” women, so he has final say over their decisions.[17] Or maybe this is just a perk women enjoy, one that provides an “out” for problematic vows and oaths.
The Torah doesn’t seem to give men a similar “out.” “He shall not desecrate his word.” Indeed, Yiftach did not see a way out of his vow.[18] On the other hand, even though Shaul swore anyone who ate during the battle with the Philistines would die, when his son Yonatan was singled out for eating we’re told: “the people saved Yonatan and he did not die.”[19] Perhaps the people spared Yonatan because they understood he did not break the oath intentionally. Yet it’s also possible they decided the oath itself was not intentional; since it was made without considering the repercussions, it is not valid.[20]
Releasing vows
The mishna in Chagiga discusses the connection between various halakhot and their basis in the Torah, and states: “The release of vows (heter nedarim) float on air, they aren’t based on anything.”[21] According to the mishna, the release of vows is permitted even though there’s no Torah source to base it on.
One could argue that the mishna means that the law is halakha l’Moshe m’Sinai, an oral law given to Moshe on Mount Sinai without any mention in the Written Torah.[22] Nevertheless, both the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds search for a source (interestingly, they don’t rely on the story of Shaul’s son, Yonatan).[23]
The sources can be divided into two types. Some of them focus on the mindset of the person making the vow, using Biblical verses to support the idea that an oath may no longer be binding after a change in mindset. To this end, God’s statement, “that I swore in my wrath” is used as proof that a vow made in anger can be voided.[24] Similarly, the statement “I swore and I will fulfill,” like Levi Eshkol’s statement, supports the idea that not every oath is binding, and there are times one can make an oath and not fulfill it.[25] Alternatively, since the text describes those who brought voluntary donations (nedavot) to the Tabernacle as “everyone whose heart moved them,” so it seems that it’s not enough to voluntarily make the pledge, the fulfillment must carry the same motivation.[26]
Yet another source focuses on the idea of an outside party: “‘He can’t desecrate (yakhel) his vow,’ he can’t forgive (mokhel) his own vow, but others can forgive it on his behalf.”[27] Although halakhic authorities explain the mechanisms are different, this seems to be somewhat similar to hafarat nedarim, annulling vows. In both cases the person who made the vow is bound by their word and it can only be broken by an external agent.[28]
These two types of sources mirror the two elements involved in the halakhic process of hatarat nedarim. The first is an external agent – a chacham (sage, wise man) or a beit din. The second is the release mechanism – some sort of petakh, an “opening” or “catch.” Sometimes the person who made the vow realizes their mistake on their own and regrets their words; other times a chacham helps the person find some aspect that, had they known, they would not have made the vow.[29]
The chacham or beit din acts as the external agent necessary to release the individual from their vow. The Torah teaches that the laws of nedarim were given to the heads of the Israelite tribes. We discussed how the head of each family was responsible for the vows of their wives or daughters; perhaps the heads of the tribes were given a similar responsibility over the Israelites’ vows.[30] There is a certain similarity between the consent the contemporary authorities must provide to release a man from his vows and the consent a father or husband must provide to uphold a woman’s vows.[31]
The second element in the release of vows is “charata,” regret. This person made a vow or oath in the past, when they had a certain mindset; with time they see the flaws or short-sightedness in that past decision. Regret comes from within, it’s the personal realization that the vow was a mistake. If the person can’t realize this independently, the chacham steps in here as well, “opening” a door to help the individual understand their mistake.[32] Some halakhic authorities maintain that each element alone is sufficient to release someone from their vow, but others rule both are necessary.[33]
Concluding thoughts
A vow can be seen as a choice to give up one’s freedom of choice. Instead of acting according to one’s present conscience, the vow acts instead; it’s an external force that locks them into a certain mode of behavior, regardless of their current internal motivation. At times it may also be an attempt to “lock” God into a certain action. Yet on those occasions that the vow itself is positive and it leads to positive actions, one could still claim “better than both is to make a vow and fulfill it.”[34]
It’s possible the Oral Torah introduces an external mechanism to release an individual from their vow to balance out the vow’s negation of individual free choice. If the vow is an external power, forcing someone to act in a way that is contrary to their own free will, the external force of another person can cancel that of the vow. When the vow is “released” the zadon (intentional, purposeful) aspect of the vow morphs into a shegaga (unintentional act). This should teach us that the opportunity to choose another course of action is always there; even if we choose not to change course, this should be done intentionally and willingly, based on where we are in the present and not on a choice we made in the past. When we act with intention we demonstrate that: “better than both is not to make a vow in the first place.”[35]
[1] Mishna Bava Metzia 4:2; Bava Batra 3a.
[2] Bamidbar 6:30; Devarim 23:22-24.
[3] Devarim 23:22-24; Yona 1:16, 2:10; Tehillim 50:14, 56:13.
[4] Bereishit 28:20-22.
[5] Bamidbar 6:1-8; Shmuel I 1:11.
[6] See Shmuel I 3:17, 14:44-45; Melakhim II 23.
[7] Vayikra 19:12.
[8] Devarim 23:24; Kohelet 5:4.
[9] Tosefta Chullin 2:17; Midrash Tanaim Devarim 23:23; TB Nedarim 9a-10a.
[10] This may explain Rabbi Elazar’s midrashic opinion that Chana “spoke impertinently toward Above.” TB Berakhot 31b.
[11] The prohibition against adding onto the Torah: Devarim 4:2, 13:1.
[12] Shoftim 11:30-40.
[13] Pirkei DeRabbi Eliezer Chapter 10.
[14] Shmuel I 1-3.
[15] Bamidbar 30:3-17.
[16] TB Nedarim 79b; Ketubot 71b; Shulchan Arukh YD 234:55.
[17] Mishna Nedarim 11:1; TB Nedarim 79b; TB Ketubot 46b-47a and parallels; Shulchan Arukh ibid.
[18] ibid, note 12.
[19] Shmuel I 14:24-45. The consequences for breaking the vow were stated at the beginning of the battle, and were repeated when God didn’t answer Shaul’s questions after the battle.
[20] First opinion: Ramban Vayikra 27:29; Metzudot David Shmuel I 14:45. Second opinion: Malbim ibid.
[21] Mishna Chagiga 1:8.
[22] Alei Tamar Yerushalmi Chagiga 1:8.
[23] TB Chagiga 10a; TY Chagiga 1:8.
[24] Tehillim 95:11
[25] Tehillim 119:106
[26] Shemot 35:5
[27] TB Chagiga 10a; Tosefta Chagiga 1:11: “Heter nedarim float in the air, and they have nothing to rely upon, but the sage permits based on their wisdom.”
TY Chagiga 1:8: “There it’s written: The sages released four [types of] vows. They don’t release all [types of] vows? As it’s written ‘Moshe spoke to the heads of the tribes of the Children of Israel,’ the section bases it all on the heads of the tribes – to release their vows for them.’” (Bamidbar 30:2)
[28] When it comes to women, the father or husband “release” the neder (hafara), whereas the sage “permits” or “annuls” the neder (hatara). The relationship between the two is unclear. There are internal debates about each as to whether the vow is annulled at that moment, or retroactively it’s as if it was never made.
See Tb Nedarim 68a-b; TB Nazir 21b (hafarat neder); TB Ketubot 74b (hatarat neder); Rambam Hilkhot Nedarim 13:2 compared to 15.
[29] For a summary of the laws see Shulchan Arukh YD 228:1-4.
[30] See note 27; Shadal Bamidbar 30:2.
[31] TB Shabbat 46b and parallel sources.
[32] For more on the relationship between charata and petach see Tur YD 228.
[33] See Rav Asher Weiss:
[34] ibid note 9
[35] ibid
